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In this paper, I aim to answer a part of the ideational questions emerging in the scope of 
constitutional identity with special regard on the Seventh Amendment of the Fundamental Law 
of Hungary and the Hungarian scientific literature. In the first part of the study, I review the 
scientific concept of identity, after which I introduce the theoretic definition of national identity 
and argue that the constitutional courts of the member states of the EU properly identify it with 
the concept they call constitutional identity. Thereafter I capture the essence of constitutional 
identity, by making distinction between this one and national identity, then based on the theory 
of Carl Schmitt I draw the lines between eternity clauses and the latter concept. I also 
differentiate between the two sides of constitutional identity which I call general and special 
sides. I argue that constitutional identity can only limit the power of other sovereigns and 
international entities but not the constitution amending power. Last but not least, I draft my own 





In the light of Article E) Paragraph (2) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, it is obvious that 
the main point of the Seventh Amendment of the Hungarian constitution was to defend 
sovereignty.3 The aforementioned Article was amended with the following sentence 
emphasizing the definition of state provided by Jellinek4: “the exercise of the competences of 
the European Union cannot limit the unalienable right of Hungary to preserve its territorial 
unity, population, form and political system.”5 In correlation with this, Article R) of the 
constitution reflecting to the process of the European integration was also amended with the 
                                                          
1 The Hungarian version of the study will have been published in Review of Public Law [Közjogi Szemle]. 2019. 
3rd Vol.  
2 I am inexplicably grateful to dr. Boldizsár Szentgáli-Tóth, young research fellow at the Institute for Legal 
Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences for his remarks and observations. 
3 Before the 7th amendment Article E) Paragraph (2) ruled the following: “With a view to participating in the 
European Union as a Member State and on the basis of an international treaty, Hungary may, to the extent 
necessary to exercise the rights and fulfil the obligations deriving from the Founding Treaties, exercise some of 
its competences set out in the Fundamental Law jointly with other Member States, through the institutions of the 
European Union.” 
4 Georg Jellinek: Allgemeine Staatshlehre [General theory of state]. Verlag von O. Häring, Berlin 1914. pp. 394-
433. 
5 See: Fundamental Law of Hungary: Article E) Paragraph (2). 
https://www.kormany.hu/download/e/02/00000/The%20New%20Fundamental%20Law%20of%20Hungary.pdf 
following 4th Paragraph: „All entities of the state are obliged to defend the constitutional 
identity and Christian culture of Hungary.”6 
During the process of European integration the concept of constitutional identity emerged in 
the practise of the constitutional courts of member states as a boundary of integration. Article 
4 Paragraph (2) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) declares: „The Union shall respect 
[…] Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities”
7 The Treaty identifies 
national identity with the „fundamental structures, political and constitutional, […] self-
government, […] territorial integrity […] and maintaining national security”
8 of member states. 
The constitutional courts of member states elaborated the content of their own national 
constitutional identities based on the concept of national identity incorporated in the TEU. In 
the frameworks of this process they aimed to define an inviolable core of the national 
constitution that could work as a limitation for the secondary legal sources of the EU. Even 
though constitutional identity not only emerged in the practise of the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
(BVerfG) but also in the practise of the European Court of Justice (ECJ),9 its concept is not clear 
even today. The Constitutional Court of Hungary dealt with the question of constitutional 
identity firstly in Decision No. 22 of 2016.10 in which only general statements were made and 
the relevant dogmatic and theoretic questions were not analysed in depth.11 
The author of this paper starts from the principle that the clarification of the referring dogmatic 
questions is the precondition of any further scientific discourse on constitutional identity, 
because that is the only way legal problems caused by this concept can be responsibly answered. 
Taking this into consideration, in the frameworks of this study I aim to capture a possible 
definition of constitutional identity and answer a part of the relevant dogmatic problems. First, 
I present the meaning of identity, then the concept of constitutional identity by summarizing 
not only the distinctions but also the connections between constitutional and national identity 
and I finally discuss the relation between eternity clauses and constitutional identity based on 
Carl Schmitt’s theory. 
 
1. The scientific concept of identity 
 
The word identity originates from the Latin identitas, -atis, coming from the pronoun idem 
(eadem, idem) which basically means: ’the same’. Identity is a psychological, sociological and 
sociopsychological concept adapted by jurisprudence. For this reason the meaning of this word 
                                                          
6 See: Fundamental Law of Hungary: Article R) Paragraph (3). 
https://www.kormany.hu/download/e/02/00000/The%20New%20Fundamental%20Law%20of%20Hungary.pdf  
7 Treaty on the European Union: Article 4 Paragraph (2). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012M%2FTXT 
8Treaty on the European Union: Article 4 Paragraph (2). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012M%2FTXT 
9 Tímea Drinóczi: Az alkotmányos identitásról. Mi lehet az értelme az alkotmányos identitás alkotmányjogi 
fogalmának? [On constitutional identity. What can be the reason of the concept of constitutional identity?] MTA 
Law Working Papers 2016. 15. sz. 
10 See: Decision No. 22 of 2016. ABH 2016, 456, pp. 456-474. 
http://public.mkab.hu/dev/dontesek.nsf/0/1361afa3cea26b84c1257f10005dd958/$FILE/EN_22_2016.pdf 
11 The concept of constitutional identity was first used in Hungary by László Trócsányi, former judge of the 
Constitutional Court of Hungary in his ‘parallel explanation’ appended to Decision No. 143 of 2010. ABH 2010, 
pp. 698–722. 
must be explained before starting the substantive discussion on constitutional identity that 
would make the concept of constitutional identity more circumscribable. 
According to the relevant scientific literature, the word identity expresses that someone can 
identify himself/herself with his own or a group of people;12 the ontological feeling of certainty 
which implies free acting and the identification with the own body of someone.13 Moreover, 
the dualistic meaning of identity inheres those features and attributes that makes a person or a 
community unique.14 Consequently, the word can be interpreted in two seemingly opposite 
ways. On the one hand, it emphasizes the identification with the collective: the feeling of 
belonging somewhere. On the other hand, it concentrates on individualization, under which it 
is meant how someone differentiates himself/herself from others and any group of people. It is 
worth mentioning, that according to Erik Erikson, who created one of the most significant 
theories on identity, identity is not a static but a dynamic concept changing in accordance with 
psychosocial stages of the lives of people.15 His opinion is similar to the one of the Hungarian 
political scientist, Barna Bodó, who believes that identity is a changing concept that can be 
examined in particular moments and is made up of factors defining the individual the most.16 
In conformity with the upper mentioned, not only a person but any human community e.g. 
nations and nationalities can have identities. Such an identity-creating element can be for 
example gender, language, religion, traditions and history that defines both individuals and 
communities, because these all belong to the individual and collective integrity. Apart from the 
possible identity-concepts, I examine the national identity in the following chapter, which is 
one of the elementary preconditions of defining constitutional identity.17 
 
2. National identity 
 
On closer inspection, the concept of national identity reflects the elemental dogmatic 
dissonance featuring the scientific and public discourse on constitutional identity. Explaining 
the concepts of national identity incorporated in Article 4 Paragraph (2) of the TEU and 
constitutional identity used by the constitutional courts of member states, is a necessary 
requirement of any further discourse. In this heading I present the nature of national identity, 
after which I grasp the essence of constitutional identity. 
Before clarifying the concept of national identity, the idea of nation must be examined. 
According to the theory of Anderson, a nation is an imagined community made up of equal 
persons who are connected to one another by a strong cultural bond.18 A nation is a historically 
evolved organic concept, which - besides the dominant nation – is made up of basically 
culturally and ethnically definable nationalities living inside the borders of the state, who can 
                                                          
12 Ferenc Pusztai – Károly Gerstner – Ágnes Bíró: Magyar Értelmező Kéziszótár [Hungarian Interpretive 
Dictionary]. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 2008. pp. 416. 
13 Györgyi Földes: Identitás. [Identity] In: Média- és kultúratudomány. 2008. 1. sz. pp. 92-108. 
14 Hungarian Larousse Encyclopedia (2nd Vol.) [1992]. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, pp.176. 
15 Erik Eriksen cited by: Katalin N. Kollár – Éva Szabó: Pszichológia pedagógusoknak [Psychology for 
pedagogue]. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest 2004. pp. 235. 
16 Barna Bodó [2004]: Az identitás egyetemessége. [The universality of identity]. Polis Könyvkiadó, Kolozsvár 
2004. pp. 13-15. 
17 The scientific literature also uses the naming: national constitutional identity or constitutional identity of the 
member-state, identity of the member state and identity of the constitution. Hereafter, for the sake of simplicity, I 
use the naming: constitutional identity. 
18 See: Benedict Anderson: Imagined Communities. New Left Books, London 1983. 
also be called state-composing elements.19 Apart from national identity there are numerous 
identities (e.g. religious, ethical and moral, cultural, historical, political identities etc.) 
simultaneously existing in a society.20 These identities not only alter slowly or more rapidly in 
accordance with the changes affecting the nation, but they even shape each other. This mixture 
of social and cultural values can be called national identity coming into existence as a result of 
effects of certain identities whether enhancing or moderating one another. This also indicates, 
that national identity is an extraordinarily abstract, political and sociological concept 
encapsulating the traditions, cultural values and the historical consciousness of the nationalities 
of a country, especially the dominant nation.21 These are the features making the nation a 
coherent community itself.22 It is no surprise, that these values are mostly rooted in religion, 
language, history or the approach of specific social institutions like family.23 Consequently, 
under national identity incorporated in Article 4 Paragraph (2) of the TEU, not the above 
worded theoretic concept has to be meant. The reason for this is that it is a constantly changing 
abstract concept, therefore it would be quite displeasing if any legal effect came from this 
merely theoretic concept. As a result, I reckon, that based on the upper worded reasoning the 
constitutional courts of member states adequately implemented the concept of constitutional 
identity instead of the national one. 
 
3. Constitutional identity 
 
In the following chapter, I present the nature of constitutional identity through its differences 
from eternity clauses and the connections to the problem of constitutional amendments affecting 
constitutional identity. However, to be able to achieve this goal, I first review how constitutional 
identity becomes a legal concept. 
 
3.1. The main aspects of constitutional identity in the theory of constitutional law 
 
The way constitutional identity becomes a legal concept can be understood through the 
definition of constitution. There are basically two approaches regarding the idea of constitution. 
On the one hand, the formal definition of the constitution considers it as enforceable legal 
document standing above any other acts of state and regulating the grounds of the construction 
of state. On the other hand, taking the material definition into consideration, a constitution can 
be regarded as an attempt of a nation to define itself or a combination of values and principles 
                                                          
19 This definition mainly reflects the idea of a political nation corresponding better to principle of popular 
sovereignty.  
20 Michel Rosenfeld: The Identity of the Constitutional Subject. Routledge, New York 2010. pp. 30-41. 
21 Garry Jeffrey Jacobsohn: Constitutional Identity. Harvard University Press. London 201. pp. 42.  
22 Elke Cloots: National Identity, Constitutional Identity, and Sovereignty in the EU. Netherlands Journal of Legal 
Philosophy. 2016. 2nd Vol. pp. 82-98. 
23 Márton Sulyok: Nemzeti és alkotmányos identitás a nemzeti alkotmánybíróságok gyakorlatában. [National and 
constitutional identity in the practise of the constitutional courts of member states]. In.: Anna Mira Jakó: Nemzeti 
identitás és alkotmányos identitás az Európai Unió és a tagállamok viszonylatában. [National and constitutional 
identity regarding the relation of the European Union and the member states]. University of Szeged - Faculty of 
Law. Szeged, 2014. pp. 44. 
shared by a nation.24 Moreover, there are definitions emphasizing the function of the 
constitution and stating that its main point is to grant the freedom of citizens and limit the power 
of public.25 All these necessarily lead to, the conclusion that there is no value-neutral 
constitution.26 So much so that since the French Revolution it has been a fundamental 
prerequisite of the liberal idea of constitution, that in case of not fulfilling the material 
requirements of constitutionalism (e.g. separation of powers and granting human rights), there 
is no constitution at all.27 
The material ideas of constitution highlight, that both constitutional law and the constitution 
itself emerge from and regulate culture,28 thus the ideal and functioning constitution must be 
culturally embedded. According to this and the above mentioned attempts of definition, we can 
come to the conclusion, that constitutional identity becomes a legal concept as the drafter of the 
constitution selects some of the components of national identity and declares them in a legal 
document called constitution when creating it. This sets up a strong bond between the emotional 
and political attitude of the community standing under the power of the constitution and the 
social reality the constitution was made and going to work in.29 
 
3.2. The relation between national and constitutional identity 
 
As I previously argued, national and constitutional identity are in a part to whole relation.30 
Constitutional identity is a concept budding on the soil of national identity, “that has to be 
searched for in the frames of the constitution”.31As a consequence, constitutional identity can 
only exist if this narrower concept does not secede from the broader and cultural concept of 
national identity. This is what Balázs Schanda, judge of the Constitutional Court of Hungary 
highlights, according to whom constitutional identity just like the constitution must be in tune 
with the traditions of the nation.32 Jacobsohn also points out this correlation when stating, that 
the text of the constitution could be anything, but until the practice of reality did not seem to 
confirm it, it could not be called constitutional identity.33 These statements raise the very legal 
question if - apart from the obvious examples - it could be a subject of legal evaluation how 
                                                          
24 László Trócsányi: Nemzeti alkotmányok, európai integráció és alkotmányos identitás. [National constitutions, 
European integration and constitutional identity]. In: Acta Universitatis Szegediensis : Acta juridica et politica. 
2017. 1st Vol. pp. 319-328. 
25 Dieter Grimm: Types of Constitution. In: Michel Rosenfeld – András Sajó [2012]: The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Constitutional Law.  Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012. pp. 101–102. 
26 András Bragyova – Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz: „Vannak-e megváltoztathatatlan normák az 
Alaptörvényben?” [“Are there any unamendable norms in the Fundamental Law?”] In: Állam- és Jogtudomány 
2016. 3rd Vol. pp. 52-53. 
27 See: Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen Article XVI: „Any society in which the guarantee of 
rights is not assured, nor the separation of powers determined, has no Constitution.” 
28 Jacobsohn op. cit. pp. 67. 
29 The absence of these conditions characterized the so called socialist constitutions. These constitutions fulfilled 
the requirements of constitutionalism in principle, but they did not prevail in the practise at all. 
30  Norbert Tribl: Az alkotmányos identitás fogalomrendszere jogelméleti megközelítésben [The conceptual system 
of constitutional identity in an approach of legal theory]. In: Jogelméleti Szemle. 2018. 1st Vol. pp. 156. 
31 Jacobsohn op. cit. pp. 88. 
32 Balázs Schanda: Alkotmányos értékek - alkotmányos identitás. [Constitutional values – constitutional identity] 
In.: Pozsár (et.al.): A szabadságszerető embernek - Liber Amicorum István Kukorelli [For the freedom-loving 
man – Liber Amicorum István Kukorelli]. Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest 2017. pp. 89-97.  
33 Jacobsohn op. cit. pp. 89. 
much a value, a principle or an institution is embedded in the society and how anything legally 
binding could be derived from it. 
Besides the legal and cultural quality and their enforceability, the lines between the two 
concepts can be drawn even based on their subjects. Obviously, the subject of national identity 
is the nation, whereas the subject of constitutional identity – according to the theory of 
Rosenfeld – was the constitutional self, made up of the citizens bound by the constitution, the 
drafter of the constitution and the constitution itself.34 In contrast, it is a similarity that both 
concepts are constantly changing and come into being as a result of an organic evolution. 
It can be seen, that there is both a dynamic and static approach of constitutional identity. The 
former regards constitutional identity as an organic evolution, whereas the latter considers it  a 
snapshot. This is what Sulyok mentions, according to whom “particular approaches, as a part 
of a dynamic examination but in static constitutional moments,35 aim to determine those values, 
in the direction of which the constitutional policy, the rising attention of the public turns, and 
therefore becomes protected values of the constitutional jurisdiction.”36 Nonetheless, these 
approaches are nothing else but the two sides of the same coin. The exploration of the 
regulations amid the corners of the constitution is also an exploration of an organic 
development, because the constitution itself was also created as a result of this evolution.37 
Although, the organic approach implies the primacy of historical interpretation of the 
constitution, and even raises the problem of the relation of written and unwritten constitutions.38 
Regarding the idea of historical constitution included in the preamble of the Fundamental Law 
of Hungary and its achievements mentioned in Article R) Paragraph (3) this theoretical issue 
can raise serious further questions.39 
Beyond the differentiation between national and constitutional identity other lines must be 
drawn. In the following heading I dissertate on the dogmatic relation between constitutional 
identity and eternity clauses focusing on the practise of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (The 
                                                          
34 Rosenfeld op.cit. pp. 66. 
35 Such a constitutional moment was the accession of Hungary to the EU causing fundamental constitutional 
changes. See: András Sajó: A Constitution without a constitutional moment. In.: International Journal of 
Constitutional Law. 2005. 3rd Vol. pp. 243–261. 
36 Sulyok op. cit. pp. 45. 
37 This „snap-wise” approach of constitutional identity is indicated by the naming: identity of the constitution. 
38 See on the problem of written and unwritten constitutions: Ádám Rixer: A történeti alkotmány lehetséges 
jelentéstartalmai [The possible interpretations of the historical constitution]. http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/rixer47.html 
(2019.02.26.) 
39 See: Imre Képessy: Az Alaptörvényről és a történeti alkotmányról - Kerekasztal beszélgetés az ELTE Állam- 
és Jogtudományi Karán. [On the Fundamental Law and the historical constitution – Roundtable at Eötvös Lóránd 
University - Faculty of Law]. In: Jogtörténeti Szemle. 2012. 2nd Vol. pp. 59-61.;  
Barna Mezey: A Nemzeti Hitvallás jogtörténeti elemei. [The historical elements of the National avowal]. In: Az 
új Alaptörvényről – elfogadás előtt. [On the new Fundamental Law – before accepting]. Országgyűlés 
Alkotmányügyi Bizottsága, Budapest 2011. pp. 38.; 
András Milánkovich: Vívmányok a gyakorlatban. [Achievements in practise]. https://arsboni.hu/vivmanyok-a-
gyakorlatban/ (2019.02.22.) 
Milánkovich András – Szentgáli-Tóth Boldizsár: Díszítő elem, vagy új értelmezési távlatok? A magyar közjog 
történeti dimenziói az Alaptörvény tükrében. [Ornamental element or new horizons of interpretation? The 
historical dimensions of Hungarian public law]. In: Közjogi Szemle, 2014. 4th Vol. pp. 65-74.; 
László Sólyom: Alkotmány és alkotmányos kultúra Magyarországon. [Constitution and constitutional culture in 
Hungary]. https://tte.hu/solyom-laszlo-alkotmany-es-alkotmanyos-kultura-magyarorszagon/ (2019.02.26.); 
András Varga Zs.: Történeti alkotmányunk vívmányai az Alaptörvény kógens rendelkezésében. [The 
achievements of the historical constitution regarding the cogent regulations of the Fundament Law]. Iustum 
Aequum Salutare. 2016: 4th pp. 83-89.; 
Federal Constitution Court), before which I summarize the theory of Carl Schmitt on constituent 
and constitution amending power.  
 
3.3. The antecedents of constitutional identity in the jurisprudence of Carl Schmitt 
 
The theoretical bases of constitutional identity were created by the German scholar, Carl 
Schmitt, who published his iconic book Verfassungslehre (Studies on constitution) in 1928. 
The ideas of Schmitt basically influenced the evolution of the German constitutionalism 
through the eternity clause (Ewigkeitsklasuel) incorporated in Article 79. Paragraph (3) of the 
German Fundamental Law (Grundgesetz). Schmitt made a distinction between the original 
constituent power (pouvoir constituant originaire) he claimed to be unlimited and the derived, 
thus limited constitution amending power (pouvoir constituant dérivée).40 The former, because 
of its absolute quality, could not be restricted at all when drafting the constitution, whereas the 
latter on the grounds of having been derived from the constituent power was restricted by different 
conditions. The reason for this is that the constitution amending power did not have an authority 
to overwrite the will of the constituent power (basically the monarch or the people). According 
to Schmitt, only the constituent power had the right to make a decision on the form of its own 
political existence such as the form of state or government, separation of powers or the declaration 
of human rights.41 Schmitt argues that these elements could not be enumerated exhaustively but 
only as a way of illustration. 
Schmitt divided the constitution into two levels: (1) the basic structure created and determined by 
the constituent power and (2) the other regulations of the constitution.42 The former included the 
fundamental elements and features of the political system, which Schmitt claimed to be the 
constitution in the real sense. Accordingly, its modification would cause such a great change that 
de facto a new constitution and political installation would be created that the constitution 
amending power was not entitled to execute. All in all, Schmitt presented the inviolable core of 
the constitution, which could not be changed by anyone excluding the sovereign who has the 
constituent power. To my mind, it is no extravagance to say that Schmitt probably thought about 
the concept which the contemporary constitutional lawyers call constitutional identity. Even 
though his work was not cited when drafting the Grundgesetz in 1949, Schmitt’s ideas survived 
and still affect the eternity clause of the German constitution.43 
 
3.4. The connection between the eternity clause and constitutional identity 
 
                                                          
40 See on the differences between the constituent and constitution amending power: 
Virág Zsugyó: Az alkotmányellenes alkotmánymódosítás egyes elméleti kérdései az alkotmányosság tükrében. 
[Particular questions of unconstitutional amendments of the constitution with special regard on the idea 
constitutionalism] In: Állam- és Jogtudomány. 2017. 3rd Vol. pp. 99-122.; 
Richard Stacey: Constituent power and Carl Schmitt’s theory of constitution in Kenya’s constitution-making 
process. In: International Journal of Constitutional Law. 2011. 9th Vol. pp. 587-614. 
41 Carl Schmitt: Constitutional theory. Translated by: Jeffrey Seitzer. Duke University Press, London 2008. pp. 
55. 
42 Schmitt op. cit. pp. 53. 
43 Monika Polzin: Constitutional identity, unconstitutional amendments and the idea of constituent power: The 
development of the doctrine of constitutional identity in German constitutional law. In: International Journal of 
Constitutional Law. 2016. 2nd Vol. pp. 411-438. 
The content of the eternity clause incorporated in Article 79. Paragraph (3) of the German 
Grundgesetz (GG) is the following: 
“Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, their 
participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 
20 shall be inadmissible.”44 
Article 20. of the GG regulates the federal political system, popular sovereignty, separation of 
powers, the constitutional limits of the legislature and the right of resistance, whereas Article 1 of 
the GG declares the inviolability of human dignity and the obligation to respect human rights.45 
Regarding the theory of Schmitt and the upper mentioned Articles of the GG, it is obvious that 
the scholar’s idea of the basic structure and the eternity clause are heavily connected (to one 
another), which is also confirmed by the practice of the BVerfG. 
Among others, the German Constitutional Court dealt with the question of constitutional identity 
in its Solange I.46 and II.-;47 Bananenmarkt-;48 Maastricht-49 and Lisbon-decisions.50 The BVerfG 
identified the German constitutional identity with state-sovereignty and the eternity clause of the 
GG. The Constitutional Court also declared that nothing but the constituent power (the people as 
the sovereign) has the authority to amend the eternity clause. As a consequence, constitutional 
identity emerged in the practice of the Constitutional Court in two aspects. Firstly, the secondary 
legal sources of the EU contrary to the German constitutional identity should not be implemented. 
Secondly, the eternity clause determined those rights of sovereignty that cannot be transferred to 
the EU without losing sovereign statehood. In the Maastricht-decision the BVerfG also drew the 
conclusion that acts of the EU contrary to the legal authorization incorporated in Article 23 of the 
GG and the founding treaties of the EU were not mandatory. It is also worth mentioning, that the 
BVerfG qualified the federal political system, the principle of culpability51, popular sovereignty 
and social statehood as the values and principles highly protected by constitutional identity and 
inviolable by the European integration.52 
Besides the numerous questions raised by the German example, it is also an important issue, 
whether eternity clauses are generally parts of constitutional identity, or the concept worked out 
by the BVerfG is an outrageous one. According to the vast majority of the scientific literature, 
constitutional identity is a constantly changing and dynamic concept, whereas eternity clauses are 
merely static, what clearly shows, that despite their strong connection, the two concepts must be 
separated. Notwithstanding this seeming contradiction, I would argue that eternity clauses are 
generally parts of constitutional identity, but the main difference is that the regulations they 
contain were purposively given a formal defence and were enhanced from other constitutional 
regulations. The connection of the two concepts could be summarized that there is no eternity 
clause without constitutional identity, but there is a constitutional identity without eternity clause. 
                                                          
44 See: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany Article 79. Paragraph (3): https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0417 
45 See: Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany Article 1 and 20: https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0417 
46 BVerfGE 37, 271 
47 BVerfGE 73, 339 
48 BVerfGE 102, 147 
49 BVerfGE 89, 155 
50 BVerfGE 123, 267 
51 2 BvR 2735/14 
52 Tímea Drinóczi: Tagállami identitás. [Member-state identity] In.: MTA Law Working Papers. 2018. 8th vol. pp. 
9. 
Making a picturesque semblance, the eternity clause is the island located on the river of 
constitutional identity. The river, just like constitutional identity, is constantly moving, and in this 
river, there is a stable point similar to the eternity clause emerging from it and which can be 
regarded as an autonomous unit. However, neither the island without the water surrounding it nor 
the eternity clause can exist without constitutional identity.53 Subsequently, the two concepts are 
related to each other like the part and the whole, because it is possible that some components of 
constitutional identity are not included in the eternity clause. An excellent example of this is the 
eternity clause incorporated in Article 89. of the French Constitution of 1958, defending the 
republican form of state from the constitution amending power.54 Besides the content of the 
eternity clause, the French constitutional identity includes laicity, solidarity, the principle of 
“liberty, equality, fraternity”, the indivisibility of the land and the protection of the French 
language.55 Accordingly, the only thing that can be considered as something unique, is that the 
German constitutional identity and the eternity clause are creating such a strong and organic unity, 
but, as I previously argued, the connection between constitutional identity and eternity clauses is 
not coincidental but necessary. 
The most significant similarity is that neither eternity clauses nor the values, principles and 
institutions included by constitutional identity can resist the will of the constituent power and can 
be altered by any other sovereign or international organisation but the sovereign they were created 
by. In contrast, constitutional identity can be changed by the constitution amending power, 
whereas such alternation of eternity clauses is unimaginable. 
 
3.5. Identity written in the stone? 
 
Despite the fact, that according to Schmitt’s theory the elements of constitutional identity cannot 
be amended, it is worth taking into consideration that this concept would make the constitution 
so rigid that it would obstruct the constitution amending power to adjust the constitution to the 
social reality in which the constitution exists. Moreover, it would raise further problems, if the 
components of constitutional identity could not be altered. As I reasoned above, national identity, 
the base of constitutional identity is also a permanently changing concept. Obviously, 
constitutional identity must keep up with the change of national identity, because in case of the 
opposite, the social reality, the belief and ethical persuasion of citizens and the regulations of the 
constitution would become quite estranged from one another and that would, after all, question 
the legitimacy and moral validity of the constitution.56 Apart from the practical reason based on 
the upper dissertated, strict logic, the regulations included by constitutional identity could only 
be altered by creating and accepting a completely new constitution or holding a referendum. It is 
self-evident, that the former alternative is not plausible at all, and the latter is contrary not only to 
the Hungarian but plenty of other European constitutions.57 It is also against the strict application 
of Schmitt’s theory, that national constitutional courts entitled to interpret the constitution must 
                                                          
53 On eternity clauses, See.: Bragyova – Gárdos-Orosz: op. cit. pp. 35-63. 
54 See: Article 89. of the French Constitution of 1958. 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/France_2008.pdf?lang=en  
55 László Trócsányi: Az alkotmányozás dilemmái. Az alkotmányos identitás és az európai integráció. [The 
dilemmas of creating a constitution. Constitutional identity and the European integration]. HVG ORAC, Budapest 
2014. pp. 72. 
56 The problem of the collision of constitutional identity and the „identity beyond the constitution” is also indicated 
by Endre Orbán, Hungarian scholar of constitutional law. See: Endre Orbán: Quo Vadis, „alkotmányos identitás?” 
[Qou vadis, „constitutional identity?”]. In: Közjogi Szemle. 2018. 3rd Vol. pp. 11. 
57 See: Fundamental Law of Hungary: Article 8. Paragraph (3) point a) 
necessarily declare that the content of constitutional identity cannot be amended by the 
constitution amending power. This would mean that the constitutional court created an eternity 
clause and took the place of the constituent power.58 
All these raise the very question, how efficiently a concept alterable by the constitution amending 
power of the member state could be referred to against the primacy of the EU-law. Even though, 
the interpretation of the constitution, thus defining the content of constitutional identity is the 
competence of the constitutional court, it is hard to imagine, that the constitutional court, which 
is also bound by the constitution, would interpret the constitutional identity in a way contrary to 
the direct or hidden political will incorporated in the constitution. Namely, in order to do that, the 
constitutional court would have to ignore or consider particular regulations of the constitution to 
be merely symbolic. This also indicates that constitutional identity, according to the aim of the 
legislator, can easily become a matter of politics and the constitutional court can be obliged to 
indirectly take a stand on political questions, which would also cause the constitution to be 
perceived a political instrument. Whether the constitutional court let this happen is only a question 
of its autonomy, independence and activism. 
In addition, it is also worth considering, that the immoderately loose approach of constitutional 
identity would also make the constitution too fragmented. Taking the liberal idea of a constitution 
as a basis, the constitution would be made up of at least three different levels: (1) the definitive 
features of constitutionalism; (2) constitutional identity and (3) other constitutional regulations. 
These levels could be completed with (4) the eternity clause, as a fourth. Of course, these layers 
are connected and partly overlap one another, but such simplification of the constitution raises 
the further question if there is any hierarchy among the upper mentioned levels.59 
 
3.6. Attempts of definition 
 
To sum it up, constitutional identity can be defined as the following: Constitutional identity is the 
constitutional impression of national identity, including the conceptual features of 
constitutionalism and the socially strongly embedded principles, values and institutions of law 
that cannot be amended by any other sovereign or international organisation and that make the 
definitive national constitution unique and different from other constitutions. 
These principles, values and institutions of law alike the upper mentioned sociopsychological 
approach to identity, can be divided into two groups. The first one consists of the basic criteria of 
constitutionalism. These values and principles are necessarily a part of constitutional identity 
because without them a modern constitution cannot exist at all. Regarding that all member-state 
constitutions have these features,60 I name this group of constitutional principles: the general side 
of constitutional identity. This side is opposable to the complexity of principles, values and 
institutions of law that makes the constitution of a particular member state different from other 
constitutions. I name this group: the special side of constitutional identity. The vast majority of 
the scientific literature identifies constitutional identity with the side I call special. I reckon, that 
                                                          
58 This problem is raised by the basic-structure doctrine of the Indian Constitution, on which see: Virendra Kumar: 
Basic Structure of the Indian Constitution: Doctrine of constitutionally controlled governance. In.: Journal of the 
Indian Law Institute. 2007. 49th Vol., No. 3 pp. 365-398. 
59 On the hierarchy of the constitutional regulations, See: László Sólyom: Normahierarchia az alkotmányban. 
[Hierarchy of norms in the constitution]. In: Közjogi Szemle 2014. 1st Vol. pp. 1-7. 
60 Pietro Faraguna: Constitutional Identity in the EU—A Shield or a Sword? In: German Law Journal. 2017. 7th 
Vol. pp. 1627. 
in a dogmatic aspect the conceptual features of constitutionalism are also a part of constitutional 
identity, even though member states only refer to the elements of constitutional identity giving a 
unique character of the constitution so as to slow the integration down. At the same time, this 
reference cannot be inconsistent because that could be contrary to the principle of the primacy of 
the EU-law and loyal cooperation. 
Of course, the upper definition is merely a formal one, but I suppose, that such attempts of 
definition can contribute remarkably to the explanation of the basic misunderstandings and make 
the possible components of constitutional identity rest on firm foundations. In this paper, I do not 
aim to determine these components, but to mention some of the institutions incorporated in the 
Hungarian Fundamental Law and I try to be meaningful when determining the elements of the 
Hungarian constitutional identity. Beyond the ones included by Decision No. 22 of 2016. of the 
Constitutional Court of Hungary, these elements are the protection of the natural resources, 
Hungarian language, official celebrations of the state, achievements of the historical 
constitution,61 family and marriage. When defining these elements, as the majority of the 




In the current study, I aimed to answer a part of the dogmatic problems of constitutional identity. 
I made a distinction between national and constitutional identity and eternity clauses after which 
I discussed the issue of amendments affecting constitutional identity. Of course, the exquisite 
explanation of the theoretical and practical questions in connection with constitutional identity 
would not only exceed the frames of this study, but perhaps the capacity of any scholar of his 
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own. Therefore, my goal was to contribute to the scientific discourse on constitutional identity, 
hoping that one day there will be a professional dialogue adequately and responsibly handling the 
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